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Infrastructure Validation

<activation>

Activation Triggers

• Files matching: *.tf, *.tfvars, Dockerfile, docker-compose.yml, playbook*.yml, roles/, inventory/
• Config: .shipyard/config.json has iac_validation set to "auto" or true
• Templates with AWSTemplateFormatVersion (CloudFormation)
• YAML with apiVersion: (Kubernetes)

Natural Language Triggers

• "validate terraform", "check docker", "lint ansible", "IaC validation", "infrastructure check"

</activation>

Overview

IaC mistakes don't cause test failures -- they cause outages, breaches, and cost overruns. Validate before every change.

Core principle: Never apply without plan review. Like TDD requires tests before code, IaC requires validation before apply.

<instructions>

Terraform Workflow

Run in order. Each step must pass before proceeding.

terraform fmt -check          # 1. Format (auto-fix with fmt if needed)
terraform validate            # 2. Syntax validation
terraform plan -out=tfplan    # 3. Review every change -- NEVER skip
tflint --recursive            # 4. Lint (if installed)
tfsec . OR checkov -d .       # 5. Security scan (if installed)

Drift detection: terraform plan -detailed-exitcode -- exit code 2 means drift. Document what drifted and why before overwriting.

Ansible Workflow

yamllint .                              # 1. YAML syntax
ansible-lint                            # 2. Best practices
ansible-playbook --syntax-check *.yml   # 3. Playbook syntax
ansible-playbook --check *.yml          # 4. Dry run (where supported)
molecule test                           # 5. Role tests (if configured)

Docker Workflow

hadolint Dockerfile                     # 1. Lint (if installed)
docker build -t test-build .            # 2. Build
trivy image test-build                  # 3. Security scan (if installed)
docker compose config                   # 4. Validate compose (if applicable)

Kubernetes Workflow

kubectl --dry-run=client -f manifest.yml  # 1. Client-side validation
kubectl --dry-run=server -f manifest.yml  # 2. Server-side validation (if cluster access)
kubeval --strict manifest.yml             # 3. Schema validation (if installed)
kubeconform -strict manifest.yml          # 4. Schema validation alternative
kube-linter lint .                        # 5. Best practices (if installed)
helm template . | kubeval --strict        # 6. Helm chart validation (if applicable)

</instructions>

Common Mistakes

Terraform

Mistake	Fix
Local state file	Use remote backend (S3+DynamoDB, GCS)
No state locking	Enable lock table
Hardcoded secrets	Use variables + secret manager
* in security groups	Restrict to specific CIDRs
Unpinned provider version	Pin in required_providers
Missing tags	Require via policy or module defaults

Ansible

Mistake	Fix
Plaintext secrets	ansible-vault encrypt
shell instead of modules	Use native modules (apt, copy, etc.)
Everything as root	become: false by default, escalate only when needed

Docker

Mistake	Fix
FROM ubuntu:latest	Pin to digest: FROM ubuntu:22.04@sha256:...
Running as root	Add USER nonroot
COPY . .	Use .dockerignore, copy specific files
Secrets in ENV/ARG	Use build secrets or runtime injection
No health check	Add HEALTHCHECK instruction
Single-stage build	Use multi-stage builds

Kubernetes

Mistake	Fix
No resource limits	Set resources.requests and resources.limits
Running as root	securityContext.runAsNonRoot: true
latest image tag	Pin exact version or digest
No liveness/readiness probes	Add probes matching app health endpoints
Default namespace for workloads	Use dedicated namespaces with RBAC
No network policies	Restrict pod-to-pod traffic with NetworkPolicy

<rules>

Red Flags -- STOP

• terraform apply -auto-approve without prior plan review
• Security group with 0.0.0.0/0 on non-HTTP ports
• IAM policy with * action or * resource
• Secrets in .tf, .yml, or Dockerfile
• State file committed to git
• latest tag on any base image
• Container running as root in production

</rules> <examples>

Validation Finding Examples

Good Finding -- specific, shows the problem, gives the fix

**IaC-Critical: Overly permissive security group in modules/network/main.tf**

Resource: aws_security_group_rule.allow_all (line 34)
Problem: Ingress rule allows 0.0.0.0/0 on port 22 (SSH).
         This exposes SSH to the entire internet.
Fix: Restrict to bastion host CIDR or VPN range:
     cidr_blocks = [var.vpn_cidr]
Validation: `tfsec .` flagged this as HIGH severity (AWS018).

Bad Finding -- vague, no location, no evidence

**Security Issue: Network configuration may be too open.**

Review the security groups for potential issues.

</examples>

Integration

Referenced by: shipyard:builder (detects IaC files, follows appropriate workflow), shipyard:verifier (IaC validation mode), shipyard:auditor (IaC security checks)

Pairs with: shipyard:security-audit (security lens for IaC), shipyard:shipyard-verification (IaC claims need validation evidence)