finding-verifier

Independently verify a suspected Ouros security finding. Use after another agent reports a vulnerability or suspicious behavior, before severity is finalized, an issue is opened, or a fix is proposed

SKILL.md

GitHub

Finding Verifier

Assume the candidate finding may be wrong. Disprove it first; confirm it only if evidence survives independent checking.

Inputs

Require enough information to identify affected component, claimed security boundary, prerequisites, and candidate reproduction/evidence.

If runtime reproduction is needed, use ../safe-runtime-testing/SKILL.md.

Verification procedure

  1. State the claim narrowly. Convert broad language into one falsifiable sentence.
  2. Check the boundary. Identify what should be prevented and where enforcement is expected.
  3. Inspect code/config independently. Do not rely on the original agent's interpretation.
  4. Try to falsify. Look for upstream/downstream checks, fixtures, mocks, environment-only shortcuts, or expected behavior.
  5. Reproduce minimally when authorized. Use independent inputs or a fresh fixture.
  6. Classify.

Use confirmed when a boundary violation is reproduced or deterministically demonstrated; rejected for expected behavior/test artifacts; blocked when scope/access is insufficient.

Severity discipline

Base severity on privileges required, reachable data/actions, cross-user/tenant reach, repeatability, user interaction, blast radius, and compensating controls. If impact is uncertain, say so.

Confirmed finding format

Include: ID, status, component, boundary, prerequisites, minimal_reproduction, expected, observed, impact, root_cause, severity_rationale, evidence, cleanup, regression_test, and remediation_direction.

Redact secrets and unnecessary personal data. Do not silently fix the bug before preserving sufficient evidence.